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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine, in its broadest form, is based on historical
Roman and English notions that certain common properties are held by
the sovereign for the benefit of the public.' The scope of the doctrine,
however, has been difficult to define. In this country, courts have tradi-
tionally used the public trust doctrine to preserve public ownership in
the beds of underlying navigable waterways.2 Public ownership protects
three primary uses of waterways: navigation, fishing, and commerce.
Collectively, these three uses have been called the "traditional triad" of
the public trust.3
Courts later acknowledged that the public trust doctrine extends
1. For extensive discussion on the origins of the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471 (1970); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes
the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980); and Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source of the Traditional Doctrine,
19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
2. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
3. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal.
1983).
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beyond the traditional triad of uses. For example, some courts used the
doctrine to protect the public interest in swimming, bathing, recreational
boating, aesthetics, scientific study, and habitat protection for fish and
wildlife.4 More recently, courts and commentators are considering the
relationship between the public trust doctrine and private water rights.5
Extending the doctrine to the water rights context is inherently problem-
atic because it compels individuals to relinquish legally recognized
water rights for the benefit of the general public.
Application of the public trust doctrine in the water rights context
has been largely confined to surface water appropriations. Courts have
been reluctant to consider the public trust in groundwater allocation
decisions.6 One apparent reason for this reluctance is that groundwater
is not navigable,7 and historically the doctrine was heavily tied to the
public interest in navigation. Nevertheless, many of the arguments used
to advance the doctrine to surface water appropriations can be applied to
consumptive uses of groundwater as well. In fact, the development of
groundwater law indicates that states are increasingly recognizing the
need to incorporate the public interest when allocating groundwater
resources.
This comment will argue that the public trust doctrine should
encompass groundwater rights. Part II traces the development of the
doctrine through prominent judicial decisions, and will demonstrate the
flexibility of the doctrine as a means of protecting an increasing variety
of public interests. Part III contains a brief discussion on the complex
nature of groundwater flow, and then reviews the different systems that
states have implemented to allocate the resource. The examination of
these systems will illustrate how the public trust doctrine can be used to
protect public interests which may be overlooked by state allocation pro-
grams. Part IV explores the application of the public trust doctrine to a
particular groundwater controversy that has frustrated the residents of
west-central Florida. Finally, Part V summarizes some of the criticisms
of the doctrine and tests whether it is still viable in light of modem
trends in natural resources law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a dynamic concept because the interests
4. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
5. See National Audubon, 658 P.2d at 709; Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985);
Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Water, 19 ENvL. L. 473 (1989).
6. See Rettkowski v. Dep't. of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (We do not find
the public trust doctrine germane to resolving the issues before us today"). But see id. at 243-45
(Guy, J., dissenting) (advocating the extension of the public trust doctrine to groundwater).
7. See Rettkowski, 858 P.2d at 239.
[Vol. 53:363
1999] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND GROUNDWATER RIGHTS 365
protected by the trust are constantly evolving: Something that society
ignores today may become of great interest tomorrow. As a result, the
doctrine expands to accommodate these new public interests. Although
the doctrine's fluid nature makes it a difficult concept to define, courts
have identified certain rights in navigable waters which are protected
under the public trust doctrine.
A. The Public Trust in Navigable Waterways:
The Traditional Doctrine
The public trust doctrine has been historically used to preserve pub-
lic access to navigable waters for navigation, commerce, and fishing.8
Early settlers of the United States recognized.9 Rivers provided trans-
portation routes for exploration and the fur trade, and also supported
fishing for subsistence and commerce. 10 The shores of the great water-
ways became logical areas for settlement." Accordingly, early courts
readily acknowledged a public trust in all navigable waterways to facili-
tate development and prosperity. 2 The leading case to announce the
public trust doctrine is widely considered to be Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois.13 The U.S. Supreme Court's underlying rationale in this case
provides a compelling basis for expanding the public trust, rather than
confining the doctrine to dated notions of navigability.
In 1869, the state of Illinois granted the Illinois Central Railroad
title to part of the submerged beds of Lake Michigan, including valuable
commercial waterfront along the harbor of Chicago.14 Four years later
the state sought to rescind the grant, and brought suit against the railroad
to obtain a judicial declaration of title. 15 The Supreme Court upheld the
state's claim by concluding that title to the waterfront had always been
limited by the public trust.16 The Court recognized that the State of
Illinois received title to the disputed land upon its admission into the
Union in 1818.17 The Court then distinguished the lands under Lake
8. See Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 240 (1980).
9. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 431-33.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 432.
12. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
13. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For a review of the states that have relied on Illinois Central when
adopting the public trust doctrine, see Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine
in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 719-721 (1996).
14. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 448-52.
15. See Pearson, supra note 13, at 722-726 discussing the history of the case prior to the
Supreme Court's Opinion.
16. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-54.
17. See id. at 434. Under the equal footing doctrine, new states enter the Union with the full
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Michigan from other properties held by the state:
[T]itle to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake
Michigan...is....
different in character from that which the state holds in lands
intended for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the
State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on com-
merce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties. 8
Despite the Court's deference to the public trust, it is important to
note that the Court did not entirely prohibit the transfer of trust lands to
private parties. The court noted that the disposition of certain lands to
private parties may advance the public interest in navigation and com-
merce by the construction of wharves, docks, and piers. 19 Such grants
are valid when they do not substantially impair the public interest in the
trust lands that remain.2 0 However, the state may not fully abdicate gen-
eral control over an entire harbor, bay, sea, or lake. 1
As explained by the Court, the harbor of Chicago is simply too
valuable to grant to a private corporation.22 In the late 1800's, trading at
the harbor equaled the trading in New York and Boston combined. 23 By
1869, the population of Chicago "increased nearly a million souls, and
the increase of commerce... kept pace with it."'24 Based on the harbor's
importance 25 a center of commerce, the Court found it unconscionable
that the Illinois legislature could divest the state of its control of the
harbor and assign it to a private party.
Illinois Central is important precedent because of the Court's sensi-
tivity to the "face" of public interest at that time. The Court emphasized
the economic and developmental value of the harbor to the city of Chi-
political equality enjoyed by the original 13 states. Since the original states received title to lands
beneath their navigable waters, all subsequent states are entitled to the lands beneath their
navigable waters as well. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 443-47.
18. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. The Court's opinion is replete with language supporting
state ownership of navigable waters that may be adapted for public use:
'The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is founded upon the
most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural
highways, and any obstruction to the common right, or exclusive appropriation of
their use, is injurious to commerce, and if permitted at the will of the sovereign,
would be very likely to end in materially crippling, if not destroying it'.
Id. at 458. (quoting People v. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77 (1876)).
19. See id. at 452.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 452-53.
22. See id. at 454.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 454-55.
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cago and the surrounding region. In contrast, little time is spent address-
ing the issue of navigability because the navigability of the Great Lakes
was apparent. As discussed above, navigability is not determinative
because the Court explicitly supports the transfer of navigable waters
when the public interest is advanced or left unimpaired. Instead, the
core of the opinion focuses on the public value of the harbor based in
part on peoples' expectations that access to the harbor will not be
infringed by a private party.2 6 As future cases will show, the navigabil-
ity requirement becomes further eroded with the changing "face" of pub-
lic interest.
B. The Public Trust in Recreation and the Environment
The purpose of the public trust doctrine is to protect certain natural
resources for public use. Courts have long held that the doctrine encom-
passes uses beyond simply traveling along a waterway by boat.27 In
other words, the traditional triad of uses-navigation, commerce, and
fishing-does not limit the scope of the public trust. The California
Supreme Court, in Marks v. Whitney,28 recognized that the doctrine has
long included the right to "fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and
general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use
the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other pur-
poses. 29 Marks is a significant case because it further expanded the
public trust doctrine to include ecological concerns.
Marks owned a portion of tidelands that adjoined almost the entire
shoreline of Whitney's upland property.30 Marks asserted the right to
fill and develop the tidelands he owned and Whitney objected, claming
that such action would cut off his right to the tidelands as a littoral
owner and as a member of the public. 31 The court upheld Whitney's
26. Professor Joseph L. Sax asserts:
The essence of property law is respect for reasonable expectations .... The central
idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of
expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title. The
function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations
against destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional private property from
such changes.
Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185, 186, 188 (1980).
27. See infra notes 28-67 and accompanying text.
28. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
29. Id. at 380. (citing Forestier v. Johnson, 127 P. 156 (Cal. 1912) Bohn v. Albertson, 238
P.2d 128 (Cal. App. 2d 1951); Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (1869); Nelson v. De Long, 7
N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1942); Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941) Munninghoff v.
Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1949)).
30. See 491 P.2d at 377.
31. See id.
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objections, stating that, due to increases in population, the decline in
undeveloped waterfront, and public demand for recreational areas, the
tidelands were impressed with the public trust in order to preserve the
public right of access. 32 The court further added:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the
state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one
mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recogni-
tion that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a
use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of
those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favora-
bly affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to
here define precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands. 33
With this language, the court articulated the proposition that certain
resources have an inherently public nature that requires protection under
the public trust doctrine. The doctrine is thus sufficiently flexible to
encompass important natural resources regardless of their adaptability to
man-made use. Furthermore, the court refrained from enumerating
every possible extension of the public trust. Such a list would almost
certainly be impossible to create. The public interest is a fluid abstrac-
tion that changes in tandem with society. In response to growing con-
cern over the environment and recreational areas, the courts have
applied the public trust doctrine to maintain inplace, or instream, flows.
As the demand for instream flow has increased, courts have been further
compelled to examine the role of the public trust doctrine in water rights
allocation programs.
C. The Public Trust in Private Water Rights
Professor Joseph Sax, a leading commentator on the public trust
doctrine, has stated that the traditional application of the doctrine-i.e.,
protection of the public interest in navigation, commerce, fishing, recre-
ation and the environment-is generally well-developed.34 Today, new
problems arise in the context of applying the public trust doctrine to the
allocation and appropriation of water resources.3 5
The central issue facing managers of water resources is the imbal-
ance between supply and demand.36 Historically, areas of intense water
32. See id. at 378.
33. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
34. See Sax, supra note 5, at 473.
35. See id. at 474.
36. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 2 (4th ed. 1993).
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use have been in areas of low precipitation, such as the western and
southwestern United States.37 Water demand in these areas has been
satisfied by billion-dollar delivery and storage systems.38 Such large-
scale projects are no longer pursued due to the lack of public funding
and the growing appreciation for instream protection of the environment
and recreation. 39 However, in order to accommodate instream flows and
simultaneously provide for future users, it may become necessary to
reclaim some water from existing users.40
The California Supreme Court case of National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court of Alpine County (the "Mono Lake" case)41 is a
landmark example of the tension between the public trust doctrine and
existing water rights. Briefly stated, an existing appropriator has a rec-
ognized right to divert and use a fixed amount of water. Any attempt by
the state to diminish that right in favor of other uses might be deemed an
unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation. 2
However, property rights in water are not absolute.43 Due to the public
nature of water resources, an appropriator only holds an usufructuary
right, or a right that incorporates the needs and interests of others.' It is
therefore the duty of the state to regulate water use for the general bene-
fit of the community.45 In Mono Lake, the court recognizes this duty
and further expands the scope of the public trust doctrine to include the
allocation of water rights.
Mono Lake is the second largest lake in California and is located at
the base of the Sierras.46 The lake is highly saline because it has no
flow-through outlets.47 All waters that enter the Mono Lake basin even-
tually terminate in the lake. 8 The lake contains no fish, but its salinity
supports populations of brine shrimp and alkali flies which, in turn, are
the principal food source for nearly one million migratory birds
annually.4 9
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1.
39. See id.
40. See Sax, supra note 5, at 474.
41. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
42. See generally Sax, supra note 1, at 478-483 (distinguishing between private property
owned by an individual, such as an automobile, and property owned by the public as a whole,
such as a National Park).
43. See id. at 485.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See National Audubon (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d at 711.
47. See id. at 715.
48. See Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 701, 704 (1995).
49. See id. at 705.
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Mono Lake receives most of its water supply from five nonnaviga-
ble freshwater streams and loses water through evaporation and ground-
water seepage.5° In 1940, the City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power (DWP) received a permit to appropriate virtually the entire
flow of four of the streams. 5' The lack of freshwater inflow resulted in
the decrease of the lake level, a decline in surface area by one-third, and
an increase in lake salinity.52 A principle nesting island was converted
into a peninsula, subjecting the migratory birds to coyotes and other
predators.53 In addition, the exposed lake bed became difficult to access
by foot and substantially diminished the lake's scenic value.54 In 1979,
the National Audubon Society filed suit to enjoin the DWP diversions,
alleging that Mono Lake was protected by a public trust.5
In a thorough analysis, the California Supreme Court held that the
public trust doctrine does protect the navigable waters of Mono Lake
from the harmful diversions of nonnavigable tributaries. 6 The court
explained that although public trust doctrine and the water appropriation
system developed independently of each other, both were part of an inte-
grated system of water law.57 In other words, before a state water
agency approves a water diversion, it should examine the impact of the
diversion on the public interest and attempt to minimize adverse impacts
whenever possible. In reaching its decision, the court offered the fol-
lowing conclusions:
1. The state, as trustee, has a duty of "continuous supervisory con-
trol ' 58 over trust resources. "This principle ... prevents any party
from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harm-
ful to the interests protected by the public trust.",59
2. Due to the state's dependence on water diversions for prosperity
and habitability, the state legislature may grant water use permits
even though such uses may unavoidably harm the public trust. "Now
that the economy and population centers of this state have developed
in reliance upon appropriated water, it would be disingenuous to hold
that such appropriations are and have always been improper to the
extent that they harm public trust uses . .60
3. It is incumbent upon the state to consider the public trust when
50. See National Audubon (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d at 711, 715.
51. See id. at 711.
52. See id. at 711, 715-16.
53. See id. at 711.
54. See id. at 716.
55. See id. at 712, 716.
56. See id. at 728-29, 732.
57. See id. at 732.
58. Id. at 727.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 728.
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managing water resources. "The state has an affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible."61 This
duty includes the power of the state to reconsider any diversions that
were previously authorized in accordance with public trust values.62
The Mono Lake decision made several important contributions to
public trust jurisprudence.63 One notable contribution is the extension of
the public trust doctrine to the nonnavigable waters affecting Mono
Lake, thereby further disentangling the doctrine from the traditional nav-
igability requirement.' More importantly, the court established that the
state may not grant vested rights to public waters.65 According to the
court, all property rights in water are nonvested rights subject to revoca-
tion by the state if trust resources are harmed.6 6 Nevertheless, the court
acknowledged that the state must sometimes grant water rights in direct
contravention of the public trust.67 With this expansive interpretation,
the court recognized that water rights should be allocated in a way that
accounts for and minimizes damage to public waters. Carried to its logi-
cal conclusion, the public trust doctrine compels state regulators to
explore alternative water sources when current uses unavoidably impact
the public interest in navigable waterways.
The issues litigated in the cases of Illinois Central,68 Marks v.
Whitney69 , and Mono Lake70 illustrate two fundamental principles under-
lying the public trust doctrine. First, the doctrine is sufficiently flexible
to incorporate new public trust values as society's interests develop.
Second, the state, as the ultimate executor of trust resources, has the
duty to continually supervise and reconsider the allocation of these
resources. With this framework in mind, this comment will now
examine the application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater
rights.7 1
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. For further discussion on the impact of the Mono Lake case, see Blumm & Schwartz,
supra note 48.
64. See National Audubon (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d at 721.
65. See id. at 712, 723, 729, 732.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 727-28.
68. 146 U.S. 387 (1897).
69. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
70. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
71. The scope of this comment is limited to the relationship between the public trust doctrine
and appropriative rights in groundwater. The role of the trust doctrine in controlling groundwater
contamination is not examined herein. To be sure, the issue of groundwater contamination is
significant, especially since most groundwater pollution occurs through runoff from unregulated
non-point sources such as agriculture. Briefly stated, nonpoint sources are anything not included
in the Clean Water Act definition of a point source: "any discernible, confined and discrete
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III. GROUNDWATER
Groundwater is subsurface water contained in the interconnected
voids located below the water table in geologic formations.72 Although
it only makes up about 0.61% of the world's water supply,73 ground-
water provides drinking water for approximately one half of the popula-
tion of the United States.74 In order to better understand the various
doctrines that have developed to manage this resource, it is useful to
review some basic terms and concepts that govern groundwater flow.
A. Basic Groundwater Hydrology
Water falls on land as part of the long-term hydrologic cycle.75
Some of that water will seep into the soil and be pulled downward by
gravity until it reaches a depth where the subsurface is saturated with
water.76 The top of this saturated zone is called the water table, below
which flows groundwater.77 In general, groundwater that flows in both
unconfined and confined aquifers.78
Groundwater flows more slowly than surface water because most
groundwater is located in the void spaces, or pores, of rock formations.
Porosity refers to the amount of void spaces within the rock and is
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). Sections
208 and 319 of the Clean Water Act instruct states to develop plans to control nonpoint sources.
See David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean
Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 521-528 (1996).
Unfortunately, these provisions are largely voluntary and have failed to reduce nonpoint source
pollution. See id. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine as a pollution control device, see
Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485 (1989).
72. See C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5, 570 (2d ed. 1988).
73. See id. at 5.
74. See SALLY BENJAMIN & DAVID BELLUCK, STATE GROUNDWATER REGULATION GUIDE TO
LAWS, STANDARDS, AND RISK ASSESSMENT 9 (1994).
75. The hydrologic cycle describes the perpetual movement of water from the atmosphere to
the surface of the earth through evaporation, precipitation, and related processes. For further
discussion, see FETTER, supra note 72, at 4-6.
76. See id. at 4-5.
77. See id. at 5.
78. An aquifer is a saturated geologic formation that is capable of yielding an economic
quantity of water to a well or spring. An unconfined aquifer is not overlain by any other geologic
material, and its thickness extends from land surface to the base of the aquifer. The uppermost
limit of an unconfined aquifer is marked by the water table, hence the synonym "water-table
aquifer." In contrast, a confined aquifer is overlain by a confining layer, which is a geologic
formation that is incapable of transmitting significant quantities of water. The term "confined"
indicates that the water in the aquifer is under pressure. Therefore, when a well is placed in a
confined aquifer, the water level of the well will typically rise above the top of the aquifer. See id.
at 101-02.
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described as a percentage.79 Thus, the higher the porosity, the greater
the amount of water stored in the rock. It is important to note that two
different materials may have the same porosity, yet yield varying
amounts of water. This variance is due to the molecular forces of surface
tension that cause water to cling to rock surfaces.8" As the grain sizes of
a formation decrease, the surface area increases and more water is
retained.8" For example, a formation of clay and a formation of coarse
gravel may have the same porosity, but clay will not transmit a signifi-
cant quantity of water due to the smaller size of clay particles. As a
result, clays often constitute the confining layer overlying a confined
aquifer. Conversely, gravel deposits are highly permeable and make
excellent aquifers. Permeability describes the ease through which water
flows through a geologic formation.82 It is basically proportional to the
size of pore spaces through which fluid moves.83 For the most part,
hydrologists are interested in whether a geologic formation is permeable
or impermeable.
The above discussion provides an elementary introduction to some
terms and concepts of hydrology. Unfortunately, this introduction can-
not adequately convey the enormous complexity underlying the princi-
ples of groundwater flow. The mathematical equations used to predict
groundwater flow generally assume that aquifer characteristics are uni-
form throughout an aquifer formation.84 In reality, aquifers may be
highly heterogeneous, or nonuniform. For example, glacial deposits in
the midcontinental areas of North America may consist of unsorted
sand, silt, clay, and boulders.85 This variation in particle size may cause
significant variations in the permeability of glacially-related aquifers. In
addition, limestone aquifers in the southeastern United States are highly
fractured and contain dissolution cavities that may cause groundwater
flow rates to fluctuate over short distances.86 The difficulty of predict-
79. Porosity equals the ratio of the void spaces in a unit volume of earth material to the total
volume of earth materials, including voids and solids. See id. at 63-64. Primary porosity
represents the original amount of pore spaces at the time of deposition or formation of the rock.
See id. at 70. Secondary porosity refers to the voids formed by the fracturing or weathering of a
formation subsequent to deposition. See id.
80. See id. at 73.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 78.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 131-35.
85. Glacial aquifers are located in eastern Iowa, southern Minnesota, southern Wisconsin, and
northern Illinois. Some of these aquifers include the Mt. Simon Sandstone, the Galesville
Sandstone, and the Ironton Sandstone. See id. at 315.
86. See id. at 285-287. The Floridan aquifer is one of the most prolific aquifers in the world
and underlies Florida and parts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. See id. at 317.
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ing groundwater flow is reflected in the various doctrines that have
developed to manage the resource.
One final consideration for state regulators is the interrelationship
between groundwater and surface water. Groundwater and surface
water often hydraulically connected. For example, in humid eastern
states, streams typically receive groundwater discharge because the
water table in the surrounding aquifer is at a higher elevation than the
stream level.87 However, when nearby pumping wells lower the water
table below the elevation of the stream, stream flow diminishes as water
drains from the stream into the aquifer.88 As a result, the loss of stream
flow may adversely impact surface water users downstream. Despite
this interrelationship, water law has historically treated groundwater and
surface water separately.89
B. Allocating Groundwater Rights
Presently, there is no federal statute that specifically addresses
groundwater allocation. 9° Groundwater management is typically left to
the states.9' In order to deal with the unpredictable nature of the
resource, state legislatures have experimented with the common law
doctrines of absolute ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights, and
prior appropriation.92 The common law tends to emphasize the rights of
individuals over the public interest. As a result, each doctrine presents
problems which make strict adherence by the state impractical. 93 Today,
states are adopting permit systems that integrate the needs of private
individuals with the interests of the public.94
1. THE ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP DOCTRINE
The doctrine of absolute ownership, or English rule, gives land-
owners the right to withdraw an unlimited amount of groundwater from
beneath their property.95 The English case of Acton v. Blundel 96 forms
the basis of the doctrine. 97 The Acton court relied on ancient principles
87. See id. at 45-47.
88. See id.
89. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4.11 (1997).
90. See Linda A. Malone, The Necessary Interrelationship Between Land Use and
Preservation of Groundwater Resources, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1990).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 5.
93. See TARLOCK, supra note 36, at 515.
94. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
95. See TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 4.04. The absolute ownership
doctrine is still followed in Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Rhode Island, and Texas. See id.
96. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).
97. See Malone, supra note 90, at 5.
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that gave property owners control of all underlying soil.98 The opinion
also reflects society's primitive understanding of hydrology at that time.
Early American decisions, held that groundwater could simply not be
regulated because it moved "by influences beyond our apprehension."99
Due to the apparently mysterious and unpredictable nature of ground-
water, early courts adopted the position that landowners had the right to
take whatever groundwater they could pump."
The decline of the absolute ownership doctrine in this country
began as early as 1862.101 Courts recognized that the doctrine was
unduly harsh and impractical in light of the exhaustible nature of
groundwater and potential problems with its depletion. 11 2 In addition,
the science of hydrology has advanced to a point where a cause and
effect relationship can be established between groundwater pumping and
associated harms.° 3 In other words, it is no longer plausible for a land-
owner to claim that she did not notice nearby damages resulting from
her groundwater use."°
2. the reasonable use rule and the correlative rights doctrine
Courts rejected the absolute ownership doctrine in favor of ground-
water limitations based on "reasonable use" ' or "correlative rights."'' 0 6
Both the reasonable use rule and the correlative rights doctrine draw
from the surface water law of riparianism which is practiced in the
humid eastern states. The riparian system gives each landowner along a
waterbody the right to use reasonable amounts of water on riparian land,
as long as the use does not interfere with the uses of other riparian land-
owners.10 7 Together, the reasonable use rule and the correlative rights
doctrine are sometimes loosely referred to as the "American Rule."'' 0 8
98. See id.
99. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532, 541 (1850).
100. One court went so far as to hold that the malicious withdrawal of water at the expense of a
neighbor was not actionable under the absolute ownership doctrine, but that decision has since
been overruled. See Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354 (Wis. 1903), overruled by State v. Michels
Pipeline Constr. Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974).
101. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
102. See Malone, supra note 90, at 5-6.
103. See Michels Pipeline, 217 N.W.2d at 345.
104. Early courts applied the English rule based on the rationale that "it would be unfair to
compel a landowner 'to redress a wrong of which he cannot possibly have noticed."' TARLOCK,
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 4.04 (citing Wheatly v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 534
(1855)).
105. See TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 4.05[l]; Higday v. Nickolaus,
469 S.W.2d 859, 866, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577
(1862).
106. See Katz v. Wilkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903).
107. See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 21-25 (2d. ed. 1988).
108. See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
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Nevertheless, they represent two distinct doctrines.
The reasonable use rule derives from the principle that a landowner
must use her property in a way that does not injure nearby landown-
ers. t09 In contrast to absolute ownership, a landowner is only entitled to
reasonable amounts of water that can be put to a beneficial and reason-
able use on the overlying land.110 In applying the rule, the principal
difficulty is in determining what constitutes a reasonable use. Reasona-
bleness may depend, inter alia, on the nature and comparative value of
the uses, the pumping well locations, the amount of water, and climatic
conditions.' The use of water on non-overlying lands is considered per
se unreasonable.'1"2
In general, the reasonable use rule only protects landowners from
large municipal water withdrawals by forcing cities to pay for damages,
or by requiring them to pay for new wells and pumping equipment." 3
Owners of shallow wells may receive no compensation if a neighboring
landowner is pumping large quantities of water for a reasonable use,
such as a factory or apartment building."t 4 Another limitation of the
reasonable use rule is its failure to apportion water during times of
shortage." 5 Theoretically, as long as the use satisfies the requirements
of the rule, a landowner may withdraw a reasonable amount of water
even if the pumping adversely affects nearby users. 1 6
The correlative rights doctrine, which developed in California,
applies the same principles as the reasonable use rule, except that it
apportions water supplies during times of shortage to ensure that each
landowner receives an equitable share." 7 The problem with the doctrine
is in determining the standard by which pumping should be reduced
among the various users. The California Supreme Court in City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra' 8 relied on the concept of mutual pre-
scription in order to reduce pumping rates based on historical use." 9 In
that case, groundwater pumping by overlying users and appropriators
109. See TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RiGHrrs, supra note 89, at § 4.05[1]. The reasonable use
rule has been adopted in Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and
Tennessee. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Malone, supra note 90, at 6.
112. See id.
113. See Michels Pipeline, 217 N.W.2d at 350.
114. See id.
115. See Malone, supra note 90, at 6-7, 10-11.
116. See id. at 6-7.
117. See id. at 7-8; TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 4.06[l]. Other states
that follow the correlative rights rule include Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
and New Jersey. See id at § 4.06[2].
118. 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949).
119. See id. at 29-33.
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created an overdraft problem which interfered with everyone's ability to
pump in the future.120 Since the adverse users pumped groundwater
openly and continuously without any judicial intervention, they obtained
a right to pump by prescription.'21 In effect, a "wrong" became a "right"
because the original owners failed to challenge the actions of wrongdo-
ers within the five-year statutory period. The court determined that the
prescriptive rights should be propositional to actual historic use for pur-
poses of production limitations that prescriptive rights should be actual
historic use for purposes of production limitations. 2 ' Unfortunately, the
court's approach in Pasadena resulted in a perverse incentive to increase
pumping in order to establish greater prescriptive rights.'23
3. THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
The common law doctrines outlined above are based on land own-
ership. In contrast, the prior appropriation doctrine recognizes seniority
in groundwater uses that are first in time, regardless of whether the
water is used on overlying land.' 24 A water right is created under prior
appropriation when a user intentionally diverts water and puts it to a
beneficial use.' 25
The doctrine first developed to regulate surface water rights in the
arid West 126 , but its underlying rationale applies to groundwater rights
as well. Early pioneers required large amounts of water to operate
mines and to maintain settlements. 127 Due to the scarcity of water,
diversionary projects were necessary to deliver water to remote areas of
intended use.128 The prior appropriation doctrine is designed to protect
such investments and the expectation that enough water will always be
available. 29  Similarly, landowners who invest in groundwater wells
and pumping equipment are entitled to some protection from subsequent
groundwater users.
120. See id. at 31-33.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 32-33.
123. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 251 (3d. ed. 1997).
124. See Malone, supra note 90, at 8-9. Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming follow the prior appropriation
doctrine. See TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 6.03.
125. See TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 177.
126. See TARLOCK, supra note 89, at § 5.02[1]; GOLDFARB, supra note 107, at 32; AMERICAN
WATER WORKS ASSOCIAION, WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIrTY STATES AND TERRITORIES 23-24
(Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990).
127. See Malone, supra note 90, at 8-9. Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming follow the prior appropriation
doctrine. See TARLOCK LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 89, at § 6.03.
128. See AMERICAN WATER WORKS, supra note 126, at 23-24.
129. See id. at 12-13.
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Unfortunately, prior appropriation has the effect of "freezing"
existing uses into place, thus making the establishment of new uses
overly burdensome. 130 Despite the beneficial use requirement, the doc-
trine encourages waste by providing an incentive to withdraw excessive
amounts of water in order to establish rights to a greater quantity of
water. 31 In addition, prior appropriation precludes states from weighing
the value of certain uses when water supplies are in decline. 132 For
example, a senior appropriator could demand the entire flow of water,
before a more valued junior user could get any. 133 To avoid this result,
states that have codified the doctrine have tempered it with permitting
systems that establish priority uses for groundwater.1 34
4. PERMIT SYSTEMS
Common law allocation systems focus on the interests of the
groundwater user, however, modem courts realize that strict adherence
to a single common law doctrine is impractical in light of the need to
accommodate future users as well as public concerns. '3 As a result,
most states have enacted permit systems that incorporate both private
and public needs. 3 6 Florida, for example, has one of the most compre-
hensive permit systems in the country. 1 37 The following discussion will
show how Florida includes the public interest in its permit scheme, and
will also provide a useful backdrop to the case study in Part IV of this
comment.
In 1972, the Florida Legislature passed the Water Resources Act to
address water management issues facing the state. 138 The Act divides
the state into five water management districts, drawn on hydrologic
boundaries.' 39 Each district may require permits for consumptive uses
of water and impose reasonable limitations in accord with district objec-
tives. 40 Under Section 373.223(1) of the act, applicants must satisfy the
following three-prong test to obtain a permit:
130. See id. at 11; GOLDFARB, supra note 107, at 40-41.
131. See GOLDFARB, supra note 107, at 35-36.
132. See id. at 33-34.
133. See id.; AMERICAN WATER WORKS, supra note 126, at 12.
134. See AMERICAN WATER WORKS, supra note 126, at 26.
135. See TARLOCK, supra note 36, at 514-515.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 526.
138. See 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-299 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 373.012 - 373.197 (1997)).
139. See Fla. Stat. § 373.069 (1997). These districts are the Northwest Florida, Suwannee
River, St. Johns River, Southwest Florida, and South Florida water management districts. See
also Ronald A. Christaldi, Sharing the Cup: A Proposal for the Allocation of Florida's Water
Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1063, 1073 (1996).
140. See Fla. Star. § 373.219 (1997).
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(1) To obtain a permit pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the
applicant must establish that the proposed use of water:
(a) Is a reasonable-beneficial use as defined in § 373.019(4);
(b) Will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water;
and
(c) Is consistent with the public interest. 141
The first two prongs of the test reflect the state's attempt to inte-
grate the positive attributes of the reasonable use and prior appropriation
doctrines. The third prong introduces the public interest factor lacking
in the common law. A familiar problem with the test arises in determin-
ing what is a "reasonable-beneficial use" and what is included in the
"public interest." To assist regulators with permit decisions, Rule 40D-
2.301 of the Florida Administrative Code lists 14 factors for the District
to consider. 42  Despite this seemingly comprehensive list, Section
373.223(1) may allow regulators to find environmental public interests
are outweighed by other state objectives.
For example, suppose a municipality pumps large amounts of
groundwater to provide its citizens with potable water, but the withdraw-
als have the adverse effect of lowering overlying watercourses. 13 Cer-
tainly, the development of potable water supplies is a reasonable-
beneficial use of the underlying aquifer. In addition, there is a strong
public interest in providing high quality water for health and safety rea-
sons. As a result, the District will likely grant the municipality's request
141. Fla. Stat. § 373.223(1) (1997).
142. In relevant part, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40D-2.301 (1998) provides as follows:
(1) In order to obtain a Water Use Permit, an Applicant must demonstrate that the water use is
reasonable and beneficial, is in the public interest, and will not interfere with any existing legal
use of water, by providing reasonable assurances, on both an individual and a cumulative basis,
that the water use:
(a) Is necessary to fulfill a certain reasonable demand;
(b) Will not cause quantity or quality changes which adversely impact the water resources,
including both surface and ground waters;
(c) Will not cause adverse environmental impacts to wetlands, lakes, streams, estuaries, fish and
wildlife or other natural resources;
(d) Will not cause water levels or rates of flow to deviate from ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8;
(e) Will utilize the lowest water quality the Applicant has the ability to use;
(f) Will not significantly induce saline water intrusion;
(g) Will not cause pollution of the aquifer;
(h) Will not adversely impact offsite land uses existing at the time of the application;
(i) Will not adversely impact an existing legal withdrawal;
(j) Will utilize local water resources to the greatest extent practicable;
(k) Will incorporate water conservation measures;
(1) Will incorporate reuse measures to the greatest extent practicable;
(in) Will not cause water to go to waste; and
(n) Will not otherwise be harmful to the water resources within the District.
143. This example is based on the water-use conflict in west-central Florida that will be
discussed further in Part IV of this comment.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
for groundwater use permits despite the harm to hydraulically-connected
waterways. This hypothetical example is not intended to suggest that
"domestic wants" should yield to environmental concerns. Rather, it
demonstrates that even a sophisticated permitting program can overlook
particular aspects of the public interest.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater Rights
The public trust doctrine should extend to groundwater rights when
the exercise of those rights impairs public trust values. Water rights are
not absolute and remain subject to revocation by the state if the public
trust is unreasonably harmed." The public trust doctrine is applicable
regardless of whether a state assigns rights through the common law or a
statutory permit system. In fact, the doctrine may be a useful tool to
protect public interests which may be neglected in state allocation
schemes. Based on judicial expansion in cases like Marks v. Whitney145
and Mono Lake,'46 the public trust doctrine is sufficiently broad to
encompass groundwater rights.
The court in Marks v. Whitney recognize that the purpose of the
public trust doctrine is to maintain the integrity of navigable waterways
for various public interests, such as boating, fishing, and scientific
study.'4 7 When groundwater withdrawals unfairly impinge upon these
uses, the public trust doctrine should be available as a remedy. A possi-
ble jurisprudential problem with this approach is that groundwater is not
navigable. 4 However, the court in Mono Lake determined that the doc-
trine protects navigable waters from harm caused by the diversion of
nonnavigable tributaries.149 In situations where groundwater and sur-
face water are hydraulically connected, groundwater could be consid-
ered a tributary of an overlying navigable waterway.1 50 The public trust
doctrine would apply when groundwater pumping has the unwanted
144. See supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
145. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
146. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
147. See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. This case was examined supra notes 28-33 and
accompanying text.
148. See Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993).
149. See National Audubon (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d at 721. This case was examined supra
notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
150. A hydraulic link between groundwater and surface water should not be considered a
threshold requirement for invoking the public trust doctrine. There may be instances where
groundwater withdrawals impact the public trust regardless of hydraulic connection. For example,
long-term groundwater pumping is partially responsible for land subsidence of up to 21 feet in
areas of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in California. Land subsidence increases the potential
for flooding, which endangers lives, real estate, and food production. See R.A. FREEZE AND J.A.
CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 370 (1979); M.E. IKEHARA, U.S. GEOLoGIcAL SURVEY, LAND
SUBSIDENCE IN THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA CALIFORNIA (1991).
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effect of harming recreational and environmental interests in navigable
waters.
Perhaps more compelling reason for extending the doctrine to
groundwater rights is the idea that the state has a duty to exercise contin-
uous supervisory control over water resources. As articulated by the
court in Mono Lake, the state must take the public trust into account
when allocating water resources and attempt to protect public trust uses
whenever possible.15 ' This fiduciary duty includes the power to recon-
sider previously valid water uses that no longer coincide with trust val-
ues. 15 2 If groundwater is part of a state's overall water resources budget,
state officials must consider the public trust in groundwater allocation
decisions. However, it is important to note that certain allocation deci-
sions which are necessary to provide for the public welfare may have the
inevitable effect of injuring the public trust. In such cases, a state should
not disregard its obligation to explore alternatives which may minimize
future adverse impacts. The following case study illustrates how the
public trust doctrine could help resolve groundwater use conflicts.
IV. CASE STUDY: THE TAMPA BAY WATER WARS
The state of Florida is synonymous with sun and water. The penin-
sula receives an average of 175 billion gallons per day from rainfall as
well as inflow from Georgia and Alabama. 53 Despite this apparent
abundance, coastal cities face water supply problems due to the lack of
freshwater resources located along the shoreline.154 Residents of Tampa
Bay, in west-central Florida, are currently confronting problems associ-
ated with the overuse of local groundwater supplies. In West Coast
Regional Water Supply Authority v. Southwest Florida Water Manage-
ment District,155 a Florida administrative court issued a Recommended
Order that the Southwest Florida Water Management District renew
water use permits for four wellfields located in the northwest Tampa
Bay area, despite findings that pumping at the wellfields has caused seri-
ous environmental harm to the surrounding region.' 56
A. Background
The West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority (the "Author-
ity"), 157 the City of St. Petersburg (the "City"), and Pinellas County filed
151. See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727-28.
152. See id. at 728.
153. See Christaldi, supra note 139, at 1064.
154. See id at 1064-65.
155. Nos. 95-1520 - 95-1528 (Fla. DOAH 1997).
156. See id.
157. The Authority was created to provide high-quality water to its member governments. See
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suit against the Southwest Florida Water Management District (the "Dis-
trict"). 58 The District regulates consumptive uses of water throughout
all or part of 16 counties in west Florida,159  While the Authority pro-
vides water for approximately 1.8 million people within the District's
jurisdiction. 60 This case concerns the issuance of water use permits for
four wellfields operated by the petitioners. 161
Prior to 1972, the State of Florida did not regulate pumping from
the subject wellfields.162  In 1972, the District established minimum
aquifer levels to regulate the effects of pumping.1 63  As water levels
declined below the regulatory minimum, pumping was restricted.' 64 In
addition, the district "rotated" withdrawal rates among the wellfields in
an attempt to balance the effects of pumping over the water resources of
the area. 165
In 1975, the District implemented a permitting system to regulate
consumptive uses of water.' 66 From 1975 to 1989, the District allowed
exemptions for permittees who could not meet regulatory standards, so
long as the exemptions were "consistent with the public interest.' ' 67
Under this public interest exemption, the District issued a series of water
use permits for the subject wellfields, allowing withdrawals that failed to
Florida Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1969, Fla. Stat. § 163.01; Fla. Stat. § 373.1962 (1997), The
Authority's members include Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Pasco counties and the cities of St.
Petersburg, Tampa, and New Port Richey. Each member government is represented by an elected
official who sits on the Board of Directors. See West Coast Regl. Water Supply Auth., The
Authority in Water (West Coast Regl. Water Supply Auth., Clearwater, Fla.) Jan. 1996. As of July
1998, the Authority was reorganized and renamed Tampa Bay Water. However, for the purposes
of this comment, the term "Authority" will refer to the West Coast Regional Water Supply
Authority as described in the Recommended Order.
158. Collectively, the Authority, the City, and Pinellas will be referred to as the "petitioners."
159. The District was created pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 373.069 (1997).
160. See West Coast Regi Water Supply Auth. v. Southwest Fla. Water Management Dist.,
Nos. 95-1520 - 95-1528, 183 (Fla. DOAH 1997).
161. The subject wellfields are located in northwest Hillsborough County and southern Pasco
County, and include: the South Pasco, Section 21, Cosme-Odessa, and the Northwest Regional
Hillsborough wellfields. The South Pasco wellfield is owned by the City and has been operating
since 1973. See id. at 9-10. Section 21 is owned by the City and has been operating since
1963. See id. at 1 16-17. Cosme-Odessa is also owned by the City and has been operating since
the early 1930's. See id. at V 23-24. The Northwest Hillsborough Regional wellfield
(NWHRWF) began production in the mid- 1980's. See id. at 32. Due to the relatively young age
of the NWHRWF and its vaguely linear design, the recommended order contained little discussion
of the field's impact on the area's water resources. Instead, the hearing officer decided that a
default permit should be issued for the NWHRWF because the District failed to consider the
authority's permit application in a timely manner. See id. at 269-284.
162. See id. at 145.
163. See id. at 46.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 48.
167. See id. at 49, 152.
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comply with standard permitting requirements. 68 These permits were
valid until September of 1992.169 During the permitting process in the
early 1980's, the District advised the Authority that alternate supplies
needed to be developed to meet future demand.1 70 However, the District
provided little guidance as to what it would consider an acceptable alter-
native source. 17 1
On August 18, 1992, the City and the Authority filed applications
to renew the existing permits of three of the wellfields. 7 2 In response,
the District proposed on February 7, 1995, to issue one-year water use
permits for each of the four wellfields. 7 3 After the petitioners chal-
lenged the one-year limitation, the District proposed to provide ten-year
water use permits with "Environmental Protection Standards" and new
aquifer regulatory levels for each wellfield. 174 However, on July 15,
1996, after reconsidering the proposed ten-year permits, the District
issued Notices of Intent to Deny the permit applications and the present
litigation ensued.'75
B. Pumping Impacts on Lakes, Wetlands, and the Overall
Hydrologic System
Water withdrawals result in a lowering of the surficial water table
as water is drawn downward into the deeper Floridan aquifer where
pumping occurs. 176 The lowering of the water table results in the lower-
ing of area lakes and wetlands. 177 The process where water from the
surficial aquifer is pulled downward and leaks into the lower pumping
zone is known as "induced recharge."' 78 Additional impacts include
loss of wetland-dependent species, replacement of wetland species by
upland and other "exotic" species, tree loss, and increased incidence of
168. See id. at 50.
169. See id. at 52.
170. See id. at 53.
171. See id. at 54.
172. See id. at Preliminary Statement. The Authority applied for a renewal permit for the
NWHRWF on May 19, 1994 and the cases were consolidated. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 90. The geology underlying the wellfields is a three-layer structure composed
of the surficial and Floridan aquifer systems, separated by an intermediate confining unit. The
surficial aquifer is the uppermost water-bearing unit and consists of sandy, fine-grained material.
In contrast, the Floridan aquifer is a thick sequence of porous limestone and dolomite with sizable
fractures and dissolution cavities. The intermediate confining unit primarily consists of clay and
retards the movement of water, or leakage, between the surficial and Floridan aquifers. The
wellfields pump water from the Floridan aquifer, which is classified as a confined aquifer. See id.
at H 60-66.
177. See id. at 90.
178. See id. at 91.
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fire. 179 Although other factors, including reduced rainfall and increased
evapotranspiration, can result in lowered lakes and wetlands, the evi-
dence in this case establishes that induced recharge due to pumping is
the primary culprit."'
Notwithstanding the adverse impacts of pumping, the court found
that the hydrogeologic systems in the area have reached a new state of
"dynamic equilibrium." '' Prior to the development of the wellfields,
the water resources in the area were in a natural balance-natural
recharge, such as rainfall, was balanced by natural discharge, such as
outflow to the coast." 2 The introduction of pumping wells upset this
balance by artificially increasing water discharge.18 3 Over time, water
resources adjust to the change and reach a new equilibrium. Where the
increase in discharge is not matched by a corresponding increase in
recharge, surrounding water levels stabilize at a lower level than before
the pumping wells came on-line. The enormous withdrawals from the
Floridan aquifer has resulted in a shifting of the local hydrologic sys-
tems, and water levels are now considered stable at lower levels.1 84
Theoretically, now that the system has stabilized, no additional damages
should occur as long as pumping is not increased above current rates.
C. The Decision
The evidence presented to the court establishes that there will be no
new adverse environmental impacts caused by continued pumping at
current rates.1 85 "The continuation of water pumping at current actual
levels of withdrawal will continue the ecological decline already in pro-
gress, but will not result in new kinds of adverse environmental
impacts."18 6 Accordingly, the court held that the petitioners meet the
permitting criteria for pumping at average daily quantities.18 7
To review water use permit applications, the District must establish
179. See id. at 107.
180. See id. at 92.
181. See id. at 123.
182. See C.W. FErrER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 230, 444 (2d ed. 1988).
183. In a confined aquifer, such as the Floridan aquifer, pumping will reduce the water level
near the wells. This creates a "cone of depression" near the wells that expands with time. The
cone of depression will stabilize when enough downward leakage is induced to balance the
withdrawals. This induced recharge upsets the natural equilibrium of the overlying surficial
aquifer. Accordingly, the surficial aquifer must "shift" and draw water from elsewhere to prevent
from being drained. See id. at 230, 444-45.
184. See West Coast, Nos. 95-1520 - 95-1528 at in 124-126. Such a shift can take as long as
ten years. See id. at 1 124.
185. See id. at 174.
186. Id. at 175.
187. See id. at 171.
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a "baseline" against which anticipated impacts may be predicted. 8 The
establishment of an appropriate baseline is essential to determine
whether the applicant has met the conditions for issuance of the permit
and whether the applicant will be responsible for mitigating any adverse
impacts associated with pumping."8 9 The permitting history of the sub-
ject wellfields indicates that the District was aware of potential adverse
impacts when it initially granted the public interest exemptions in the
mid-1970's. 190 To date, pumping impacts have not exceeded those
which were previously deemed acceptable by the District. 9 ' As a
result, the court determined that the appropriate baseline in this case is
the conditions that existed when the renewal applications were filed in
1992.192 In effect, the Court has allowed the petitioners to disregard any
previous impacts and to start the permit renewal process with a clean
slate.
The administrative court applied the District's three-pronged test in
reviewing the water use renewal applications.1 93 Pursuant to the test, the
applicant must establish that the proposed water use is a reasonable and
beneficial use; will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of
water; and is consistent with the public interest. 194 The court concluded
that the petitioners presented sufficient evidence to meet the relevant
permitting criteria. 195 Providing potable water to customers of the peti-
tioners is a reasonable and beneficial use of the resource. 19 6 The court
also found that current withdrawals do not interfere with other legal
uses. 97 Furthermore, the provision of high quality water is necessary to
meet public health and safety requirements, and is therefore consistent
with the public interest.198
D. The Absence of the Public Trust
The Recommended Order suggests that the District is partly culpa-
ble for existing environmental damages because regulators anticipated
such impacts when they originally permitted the wellfields. Although
the District may indeed be partially responsible, the court's decision
188. See id. at 147.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 148.
191. See id. at 151.
192. See id. at 158.
193. A discussion of the District's permitting criteria is provided supra notes 136-40 and
accompanying text.
194. See id. at 172.
195. See id. at 171.
196. See id. at 179.
197. See id. at 180.
198. See id. at 182.
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wrongly implies that governmental mistakes can never be amended,
regardless of how harmful. Furthermore, the ruling does not address the
duty of the state to continually supervise water uses and to reconsider
prior allocation decisions when they detrimentally affect other interests.
If the state had recognized its duty under the public trust doctrine when
it initially considered the permit renewals, much of the time and
resources spent in litigation could have been used to negotiate the devel-
opment of alternative water supplies.
Ultimately, both parties have recognized that negotiation is in the
best interests of everyone involved. 99 A final decision on the Recom-
mended Order was repeatedly delayed to allow the District and the
Authority to negotiate a deal that would end the litigation over pumping.
The parties finally reached an agreement was reached in April of 1998
that promises to limit future lawsuits and start the search for new water
supplies.2" One proposal involves diverting runoff during the rainy sea-
son into 1,200-acre reservoir capable of stockpiling hundreds of millions
of gallons of water.20 1 Another proposal considers building a desalina-
tion plant along Tampa Bay or near the Gulf of Mexico.2 °2
Litigation over the welifield permits has already cost the taxpayers
of Tampa Bay nearly 10 million dollars.20 3 If the wellfields were shut-
down, experts predict it would take up to ten years2 4 and 180 million
dollars205 to develop comparable supplies. These numbers make it eas-
ier to understand why the permits were not denied or drastically limited.
After all, Tampa Bay residents are entitled to high-quality potable water.
Nevertheless, the state could have averted such litigation by recog-
nizing that the public trust doctrine allows the state to revoke consump-
tive use permits that harm the public interest. The District could have
issued temporary permits to satisfy the water needs of Tampa Bay while
alternative water sources were developed. In short, if the state had
acknowledged the public trust doctrine early on in this case, much of the
time and tax dollars spent litigating permit issues could have been used
199. See Neil Johnson, Players Opt to Discuss Water War, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 11, 1997,
Florida/Metro, at 4.
200. See Peter Howard, Tampa, Pasco Approve Water Agreement, TAMPA TRIB., May 1, 1998,
Florida/Metro, at 2.
201. See Ivan Hathaway, Water Group Pins Down Reservoir Site, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 3, 1998,
Brandon, at 2.
202. See Neil Johnson, Desalination Plant Proposals to be Pondered, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 26,
1998, Florida/Metro, at 1.
203. See Neil Johnson, Peace should Reign under Water Pact, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 13, 1998,
Florida/Metro, at 1.
204. See West Coast, Nos. 95-1520 - 95-1528 at $ 42.
205. See Neil Johnson, Deadline Pressure Could Drown Truce in Water Wars, TAMPA TRIB.,
Jan. 9, 1998, Florida/Metro, at 6.
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to advance the negotiation process in which the parties eventually
engaged.
V. CRITICISM OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Critics of the public trust doctrine suggest that public concern over
natural resources and the resulting enactment of environmental legisla-
tion has rendered the doctrine obsolete.2 °6 In general, the doctrine's
diminishing importance can be tied to the rise of governmental police
power. Nonetheless, the case study of the Tampa Bay Water Wars indi-
cates how the pubic trust doctrine may still be used to fill gaps in the
modern police power state.207
A. The Rise of Governmental Authority
Professor Richard Lazarus argues that the expansion of governmen-
tal police powers over the last century obviates any need for the public
trust doctrine to protect the public interest.2 °8 The trust doctrine devel-
oped during a time when sovereign authority to regulate resource uses
was limited to the property it owned.209 Today, it is well established
that state and local legislatures draft and enforce laws protecting the
public's health, safety, and general welfare.21 0 As concern over natural
resources and environmental protection has grown, the scope of govern-
mental authority has expanded to address these concerns. 2 1 Thus, by
reflecting current social values, the modern police power authority acts
as a substitute for the public trust doctrine.212
Increases in police power authority are related to a corresponding
decline in the importance of private property rights.213 This relationship
is evident from an examination of cases involving the constitutional tak-
206. Some articulate criticisms of the public trust doctrine include: Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus
Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); James L.
Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of
Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and Johnson, 63 DENV. U.L. Rev. 565 (1986); Richard J.
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning
the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631 (1986); Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust
Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 63 (1982).
207. See supra notes 151-201 and accompanying text.
208. See Lazarus, supra note 206, at 665-68.
209. See id. at 665.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 666.
212. In addition, by not relying on the public trust doctrine, litigants are relieved from arguing
threshold issues which burden public trust cases. For example, it becomes unnecessary to prove
that title to a contested resource has historically been held by a sovereign. See id. at 687.
213. See id. at 668.
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ings clause.2" 4 The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."2 5 Historically, the Supreme Court has been wary of govern-
mental infringement of private property interests.21 6 However, in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company,21 7 the Court held that when individ-
uals engage in areas of great public concern, the possibility that the gov-
ernment may later regulate such areas is substantial.21 8 With the
development of complex permit and entitlement schemes, private prop-
erty owners whose activities impact the natural environment are on
notice that the takings clause may offer little protection. For example,
the Clean Water Act requires dischargers of pollutants to obtain a permit
through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.21 9 Such
permits are not vested rights to pollute the nation's waterways; discharge
permits can be denied or taken away in order to curtail harmful
activities.
Professor Lazarus also argues that the explosion in administrative
law during the 1970's has eliminated the need to rely on the public trust
doctrine.22° The public trust doctrine was based on the traditional view
that government played no role in environmental protection; rather, it
promoted developmental activities.221 Today, modern administrative
agencies are directly involved in managing natural resources and ensur-
ing environmental protection.222 In addition, federal agencies employ
career experts in environmental matters to assist with policymaking.223
These agencies should be left to administer natural resources free from
judicial intervention under the public trust doctrine.224
B. The Tampa Bay Water Wars Revisited
Despite the advent of administrative agencies and permit schemes,
214. See id. at 668-74.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
216. See Lazarus, supra note 206, at 668-74.
217. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
218. See id. at 1008-09; Lazarus, supra note 206, at 673.
219. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (the Clean Water Act, or Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
220. See Lazarus, supra note 206, at 679.
221. See id. at 689.
222. See id. Such agencies include the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Park
Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 712-13. Intervention under the public trust is considered antidemocratic since it
allows courts to usurp the role of the legislature in allocating natural resources. In theory, the
judiciary lacks competence to consider the complexities inherent in environmental decision-
making. Such matters are better left to the administrative agencies created by elected officials.
See also Deveney, supra note 206, at 13-14.
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the litigation over wellfield permits in Tampa Bay provides a good
example of how the public trust doctrine remains useful today. After all,
the wellfield controversy persisted for several years even though Florida
has one of the most sophisticated permit systems in the country.225 The
Florida Water Resources Act created the Southwest Florida Water Man-
agement District to allocate the water resources of west-central Flor-
ida.226 Accordingly, any attempt by the state to appropriate, or "trump",
the District's authority under the shield of the public trust could under-
mine the very agency the state created to handle such permit disputes.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court case of Osceola County v. St.
Johns River Water Management District (the "Interdistrict Transfer"
case)2 27 suggests the application of the trust doctrine would not automat-
ically run a foul of the Florida Water Resources Act.
The Interdistrict Transfer case involved the transfer of water from
one district, or basin, to another.228 Brevard County applied to the St.
Johns River Water Management District for a permit to use water drawn
from nearby Osceola County, located in the South Florida Water Man-
agement District.2 9 Osceola County sought a writ of prohibition to pre-
vent the St. Johns River Water Management District from considering
the application, claiming that the district lacked jurisdiction to consider a
permit for water drawn from outside its boundaries. 23° The court
affirmed the district court's decision that the state properly authorized
the districts to consider the interdistrict transfer of water. 21' Addition-
ally, the District Court noted that:
[n]othing in the Water Resources Act indicates a legislative intent
that water management districts operate solely as independent prov-
inces, without regard for statewide concerns .... A two-tiered system
of state and regional management was perceived by legislature as the
most effective way to conserve and manage the state's total water
resources.
232
To be sure, the Interdistrict Transfer case supports the delegation
of regulatory authority to the water management districts. However,
read more broadly, the decision also supports state-level involvement in
significant water management issues. The District Court's statement
225. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
227. 504 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1987).
228. Recall that the districts are drawn on hydrologic boundaries. Therefore, the removal of
water from one district theoretically removes that water permanently.
229. See 504 So. 2d at 387.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Osceola County v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 486 So. 2d 616, 619 (Fla.
5th DCA 1986).
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reflects the goal of the drafters of the Model Water Code, the code upon
which the Florida Water Resources Act was based. 33 The Model Water
Code envisioned a system where policy making would occur at the state
level, while operational decisions would occur at the district level.2 3 4 In
reality, the districts have been granted significant regulatory authority
and have become their own primary sources of water policy.2 35 Still, the
water management districts do not have unbridled authority over state
water resources. State officials must recognize their obligations under
the Water Resources Act and provide leadership when districts become
entangled in lawsuits with statewide implications. 2 36 The public trust
doctrine may serve as a vehicle for citizens to compel state review of
inadequate administrative programs. While such review may not have
solved the Tampa Bay wellfield dilemma, it may have helped bring an
end to the protracted litigation and hastened the search for alternative
water supplies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is an effective tool for protecting a variety
of public uses in navigable waters, ranging from commerce to bathing.
Increasingly, courts are using the doctrine to protect navigable waters
from harm caused by the diversions of private appropriators. The Mono
Lake case provides the basic framework for extending the doctrine to the
water rights context. Due to the public nature of water resources, the
state has a fiduciary duty to regulate water uses for the benefit of the
general community. This duty compels the state to continually super-
vise the allocation of water rights, and reconsider those rights when pub-
lic trust values are endangered. In other words, when the exercise of a
previously legitimate water right begins to damage the public interest,
the state should reallocate the water right in a way that accounts for and
233. Between 1967 and 1972, law professors at the University of Florida drafted a legislative
proposal that combined the positive attributes of the riparian and prior appropriation systems
within an administrative regulatory scheme. To a large extent, the Water Resources Act of 1972
is patterned after this Model Water Code. See Christaldi, supra note 139, at 1072.
234. See id. at 1075 (citing Richard C. Ausness, The Influence of the Model Water Code on
Water Resources Management Policy in Florida, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3, 13 (1987)).
235. See Christaldi, supra note 139, at 1073-1074.
236. For example, state and local Tampa officials have invested millions of dollars to attract a
computer chip plant to the Tampa Bay area. Billion dollar chip factories create high-paying jobs,
provide research grants for universities, and increase municipal tax rolls. Unfortunately, these
types of plants use up to three million gallons of clean water a day. Industry experts doubt that
sufficient water supplies exist at eight of eleven potential sites in Florida. The uncertainty over
water resources in Tampa Bay could eliminate the west coast from competing for a plant and force
chip manufacturers to look out of state. See Jean Gruss & Neil Johnson, Not in the Chips: The
Tampa Bay Region's Efforts to Lure a Computer Chip Plant Could Fail Because of the Factory's
Thirst for 3 Million Gallons of Water Daily, TAMPA TRIB., June 28, 1998, Nation/World, at 1.
[Vol. 53:363
1999] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND GROUNDWATER RIGHTS 391
minimizes such damage. Based on the rationale of the Mono Lake
court, the public trust doctrine should encompass all water rights granted
by the state, including groundwater rights.
Groundwater is an inherently difficult resource to manage because,
unlike surface water, the effects of groundwater use are not readily
observable. Historically, the lack of understanding of groundwater
movement made it difficult for state regulators to fairly allocate the
resource among competing users, both private and public. As the sci-
ence of hydrology has developed, states have adopted permit systems
that now incorporate private and public interests. However, water man-
agers face additional problems when groundwater use adversely impacts
overlying surface waters. In situations where groundwater acts as a trib-
utary to navigable waterways, the public trust doctrine should compel
water managers to grant groundwater rights in a way that accounts for
harm to the connected surface waters. The wellfield controversy in
Tampa Bay, Florida, is one example of how the public trust doctrine
could be logically extended to groundwater use. By invoking the public
trust doctrine, state water agencies may be able to avoid costly litigation
over groundwater rights and encourage the exploration of less harmful
alternative water sources.
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